Recent Structured Settlement Court Decisions (2020-2026)

Structured settlement case law shifted in important ways from 2020 through 2026. Recent structured settlement court decisions in New York, Maryland, Ohio, Texas, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Alabama have clarified how the best-interest standard works, what counts as truly independent professional advice, when anti-assignment clauses bite, how state SSPAs interact with federal anti-assignment statutes, and what happens when a factoring company cuts corners on structured settlement court approval. Below, we walk through every major decision a structured settlement seller (or the seller's attorney) should know in 2026.

Catalina Structured Funding has closed more than 4,000 structured settlement transactions in nearly every U.S. jurisdiction. Our team is led by licensed attorneys, and we file structured settlement transfer petitions in courts across the country every week. The case law in this post directly shapes how we prepare every structured settlement transfer. For sellers who want a primer on the buying-side mechanics, our structured settlements hub covers offer comparison, court approval, and funding in detail.

The Federal Backbone: 26 U.S.C. § 5891 and the Qualified Order Requirement

Every state structured settlement transfer ultimately runs through one federal statute. 26 U.S.C. § 5891 imposes a 40 percent excise tax on any structured settlement factoring transaction that is not pre-approved in a "qualified order." The tax falls on the buyer, not the seller. A qualified order is a final order, judgment, or decree that expressly finds two things: the transfer does not contravene any federal or state statute or any court order, and the transfer is in the best interest of the payee, considering the welfare and support of the payee's dependents.

This federal mechanism is why every state passed a Structured Settlement Protection Act (SSPA) between 2001 and 2005, modeled on the NCOIL Model State Structured Settlement Protection Act. The state SSPA provides the procedural machinery for obtaining the qualified order, and forty-nine states have enacted SSPAs largely modeled on the same framework. The recent appellate cases below all interpret some piece of that framework. For a 50-state map of when structured settlements are required at the original-settlement stage, see our companion guide on when are structured settlements required.

Cordero v. Transamerica: The Court Is the Gatekeeper, Not the Issuer

The most consequential structured settlement transfer decision since 2020 came out of New York. In Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation, 39 N.Y.3d 399 (2023), the New York Court of Appeals held that an annuity issuer's failure to enforce anti-assignment clauses does not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The facts are striking. Lujerio Cordero, a cognitively impaired lead-poisoning victim, received a structured settlement that would have paid him over $959,000 in monthly payments. In less than two years, he transferred all of his payment rights to factoring companies in six successive transactions and netted only $268,130. Each transfer was approved by an SSPA court applying Florida's statute. Cordero later sued Transamerica, which had collected a $750 administrative fee on each transfer, arguing it had a duty to object to the sales in the SSPA proceedings under the implied covenant.

The Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals (the underlying agreement was governed by New York law). The court answered no. It held that "under the SSPA, the court, not the issuer or obligor, is tasked with being the gatekeeper who determines whether a plaintiff's assignment of periodic payments under a structured settlement agreement is in their best interests." Imposing a duty on annuity issuers to object would impermissibly create an implied fiduciary relationship that structured settlement agreements do not contemplate.

The takeaway for sellers: the quality of the SSPA hearing is the protection. There is no backstop. The annuity issuer is not going to fight a bad structured settlement transfer for you. Pick a structured settlement buyer that prepares the petition correctly the first time.

Access Funding v. Linton: Independent Advice Has to Actually Be Independent

Maryland's Court of Appeals issued the second-most-important recent decision in Access Funding, LLC v. Linton, 482 Md. 602 (2022). Maryland's SSPA, like every state's, requires that the seller receive independent professional advice on the legal, tax, and financial implications of the proposed transfer. The advice must come from a professional "not affiliated with or compensated by the transferee."

Access Funding systematically used a single attorney whose invoices were sent directly to Access rather than to the sellers. The sellers were unaware of the relationship. The court held that these transactions were not arm's-length, that the putative adviser was selected and paid by the buyer, and that the arrangement constituted extrinsic fraud preventing a fair submission to the approving court. The prior court approvals became vulnerable to challenge.

The court also held that the arbitration clause in the transfer agreement was not severable from the main contract because the clause was conditioned on a "closing" that itself required prior court approval. Compelling arbitration would "circumvent the court authorization process mandated by the [Maryland] Structured Settlement Protection Act." The question of whether a valid arbitration agreement exists in this context belongs to the court, not the arbitrator.

Maryland strengthened the rule legislatively in 2016, redefining "independent professional advice" to mean advice concerning whether the transfer "would be in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents." That is a stricter standard than the prior definition's focus only on legal, tax, and financial implications. As a seller, ask whether the professional advising you is paid by the buyer, has reviewed your dependents' situation, and has authority to recommend against the transfer.

Anderson (Ohio 2020): Best-Interest Means Case-by-Case Analysis

In Matter of Transfer of Structured Settlement of Anderson, 163 N.E.3d 112 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 2020), the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed a trial court that had denied an SSPA application based on a local rule prohibiting approvals where the seller would receive less than 50 percent of the present value of the transferred payments. The court explained that "a court is not exercising its discretion if it rejects an application based solely on a blanket policy" and that "the trial court must exercise its discretion in each case."

The court did add a notable caveat. The seller in Anderson stood to receive only 11 percent of present value, which the court called facially unconscionable absent special circumstances. The decision establishes that judges must weigh your specific situation, not apply a per se rule, while making clear that discount rates far outside market norms still draw scrutiny.

The Anderson holding helps sellers. If a judge tries to deny a fairly priced structured settlement transfer based on a rigid local-rule percentage, the SSPA requires individualized analysis. That said, the case does not relieve sellers from the need to present a coherent reason for selling, or buyers from the need to offer a fair discount rate. For more on what specific reasons judges credit and what they reject, see our companion guide on why structured settlement transfers get denied.

The Federal Conflict: 33 U.S.C. § 916 and Longshore Act Settlements

Every state's SSPA contains a universal requirement that the proposed transfer not contravene any federal or state statute. In re Great Plains Management Corporation, 665 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App. 2022) shows what that means when a federal anti-assignment provision is in play.

The case involved a settled Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) claim. The seller sought to transfer a 2025 lump-sum payment of $146,094 in exchange for $82,776. The Texas Court of Appeals held that 33 U.S.C. § 916 of the LHWCA, which provides that "no assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or payable under this chapter . . . shall be valid," barred the transfer. The court rejected the older Eleventh Circuit reasoning in In re Sloma, which had held that once a third-party insurer funds the annuity, the payments are no longer "due and payable under the LHWCA." Instead, the Texas court held that the plain language of § 916 applies to "any benefits or compensation, either being paid or owed in the future," and that any other interpretation would render the LHWCA's protections nullified by reinsurance arrangements. The factoring company was required to pay the annuity issuer's attorney's fees and costs.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals reached the same result one year later in Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company v. Roosevelt Land Partners Corp., 2023 Ark. App. 105 (2023), holding that LHWCA settlement transfers are prohibited under Arkansas SSPA §§ 23-81-704(3) and 23-81-707(e), and confirming that annuity issuers have standing to appeal SSPA approvals. The full text of 33 U.S.C. § 916 is available on Cornell LII.

The practical rule for sellers: if your underlying claim was a Longshore Act workers' compensation claim, your payments are likely not transferable under your state's SSPA, regardless of what the buyer tells you. State workers' compensation settlements are a separate analysis and depend on each state's rules.

Barber v. Stanko: Minor Settlements Need Original-Court Approval

Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed a recurring problem in Barber v. Stanko, 258 A.3d 438 (Pa. Super. 2021). A minor's structured settlement had been approved by an Orphans' Court. Years later, the now-adult payee transferred portions of the settlement in proceedings in other county courts that were unaware of the Orphans' Court approval order. The Superior Court held that the Orphans' Court, as the court that originally supervised the minor's settlement, retained authority and must approve any transfer that would modify the terms of its prior order.

The court reasoned that "requiring the court that initially approved the structured settlement to approve any change in its terms advances the SSPA's purpose to protect beneficiaries of structured settlements from being taken advantage of." SSPAs, the court added, place courts in the "position of a guardian of a person who stands in the presumptive position of the defenseless recipient of a benefit," especially when the original payee was a minor or cognitively vulnerable.

For sellers whose original settlement involved a minor or incapacitated person, the practical implication is that the buyer must identify and notify the original approving court. Skipping this step risks invalidating any later transfer order, even one entered by a different court applying the SSPA correctly.

Pinnacle Capital v. O'Bleanis: Procedure Is Substance

In Pinnacle Capital, LLC v. O'Bleanis, 214 A.D.3d 913 (2023), a factoring company paid $280,000 to co-trustees of a trust before discovering that the court approval order had been forged. The New York Appellate Division held that the company had to seek nunc pro tunc approval, and that approval was not guaranteed. The court further barred the company's alternative claims for declaratory judgment, conversion, and unjust enrichment as attempts to circumvent SSPA procedures.

The court was emphatic: SSPA procedures are not mere formalities. They are substantive requirements that cannot be bypassed by alternative legal theories. For sellers, this case is a reminder to verify that any signed court order in your file is genuine and properly entered. Reputable buyers handle that verification as a matter of course.

In re Jones: Vacating Old Orders and Downstream Liability

In In re Jones, 305 A.3d 28 (2023), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the vacation of a transfer order entered more than five years earlier. The transferee, Advance Funding, had failed to deliver the promised $75,000 lump sum to the seller. The court held that non-performance constitutes extraordinary cause justifying post-30-day vacatur, especially given the trial court's "guardian" role under the SSPA.

More importantly, the court held that "the assignee stands in the same shoes as the assignor." The downstream assignee, SuttonPark, had no greater rights than Advance Funding and was required to return all annuity payments it had received. Secondary-market buyers cannot insulate themselves from the consequences of the original transferee's non-performance.

For sellers, this case stands for a powerful proposition. If a structured settlement buyer fails to actually pay you, you can still go back to the court and unwind the transfer years later, and the buyer's downstream investors do not get to keep your annuity payments.

Ex parte Scoggins: Notice Defects Don't Strip Jurisdiction

The Alabama Supreme Court took a more buyer-favorable position in Ex parte Scoggins, 354 So.3d 429 (2021), holding that Alabama circuit courts retain subject matter jurisdiction to hear SSPA transfer petitions even when the interested parties were not properly notified as required by the Alabama SSPA. The court held that deficiencies in notice procedures are remedied by holding the transferee accountable through penalties and other consequences, not by voiding the court's jurisdiction.

The decision matters because it limits the ability of obligors and annuity issuers to use technical notice defects as a basis for unwinding completed transfers years later, at least under Alabama law. That said, it does not relieve buyers from the underlying notice obligation, which is still actively enforced.

What These Decisions Mean If You Are Selling Structured Settlement Payments Now

The recent appellate decisions push in one direction: the buyer's preparation drives the outcome. We see two patterns in our own work that the case law confirms.

The first is that judges have broad discretion in applying the best-interest standard. Two judges in the same county, applying the same SSPA, can reach different conclusions on materially identical facts. Anderson confirms the discretion must be exercised case-by-case, not by blanket rule, but the discretion is still wide.

The second is that the structured settlement buyer's quality of preparation is the single biggest variable in the outcome. Linton and Pinnacle show what happens when structured settlement buyers cut corners on independent advice or pre-approval payments. In re Jones shows what happens when buyers fail to actually fund the transaction. Cordero shows that the annuity issuer is not going to fix any of this for you.

Catalina Structured Funding has been on the buying side of these transactions for more than 15 years and has handled more than 4,000 transfers across nearly every U.S. jurisdiction. Our team is led by licensed attorneys and we read the case law as it develops. The amount we quote is the amount you receive. If you want to know what your payments are worth and how the court process would unfold in your state, call us at (800) 317-3769 or request a free, no-obligation quote on this site. For a step-by-step walkthrough of the timeline and the hearing itself, see our LP on how to sell a structured settlement and our guide to what to expect at a structured settlement court hearing. Our 50-state guide on when structured settlements are required covers the original-settlement side of the SSPA framework.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did Cordero v. Transamerica decide?

The New York Court of Appeals held in Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation, 39 N.Y.3d 399 (2023), that an annuity issuer's failure to enforce anti-assignment provisions does not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Under the SSPA, the court, not the issuer, is the gatekeeper that determines whether a transfer is in the payee's best interest.

What did Access Funding v. Linton hold about independent professional advice?

The Maryland Court of Appeals held in Access Funding, LLC v. Linton, 482 Md. 602 (2022), that prior court approvals were vulnerable to challenge because the factoring company systematically used a single attorney whose invoices were paid directly by the company. The court found these were not arm's-length transactions and that the arrangement constituted extrinsic fraud.

Can a court deny a structured settlement transfer based on a blanket percentage rule?

No. The Ohio Court of Appeals held in Matter of Transfer of Structured Settlement of Anderson, 163 N.E.3d 112 (Ohio App. 2020), that denying a transfer based solely on a local rule, in that case requiring at least 50 percent of present value, is an abuse of discretion. The court must do a case-by-case best-interest analysis.

Can structured settlement payments from a Longshore Act claim be sold?

No. The Texas Court of Appeals held in In re Great Plains Management Corporation, 665 S.W.3d 717 (Tex. App. 2022), that 33 U.S.C. 916 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act categorically bars the assignment of LHWCA benefits, even when the obligation has been funded through a third-party annuity. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reached the same result in Metropolitan Tower Life v. Roosevelt Land Partners (2023).

Who has to approve a transfer when the original settlement involved a minor?

The court that originally approved the minor's settlement. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held in Barber v. Stanko, 258 A.3d 438 (Pa. Super. 2021), that any subsequent transfer that would modify the original Orphans' Court approval order requires approval from that originating court, not just the local SSPA court.

What happens if a buyer pays the seller before getting court approval?

The buyer must seek nunc pro tunc approval, and approval is not guaranteed. The New York Appellate Division held in Pinnacle Capital, LLC v. O'Bleanis, 214 A.D.3d 913 (2023), that a $280,000 pre-approval payment did not bypass SSPA procedures and that alternative legal theories like declaratory judgment or unjust enrichment are also barred. SSPA procedures are substantive, not formal.

Can a transfer order be vacated years after it was entered?

Yes, for extraordinary cause. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held in In re Jones, 305 A.3d 28 (2023), that the transferee's failure to deliver the promised lump sum constituted extraordinary cause justifying vacating an order entered five years earlier. The court also held that the downstream assignee, standing in the same shoes as the original transferee, was required to return all payments it had received.

The recent case law all points one way: the law of selling structured settlement payments is more protective of sellers than it has ever been, and the buyer's preparation is what makes the system work. Choose carefully.